Lexicographic Definition and Lexical Cooccurrence: Presuppositions as a ‘No-go’ Zone for the Meaning of Modifiers

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Abstract

This paper deals with the problem of connections between the meanings of pairs of lexemes which are syntactically linked, as in the case of a verb and its modifier. Based on some French and Russian data, we provide evidence for the following hypothesis: a modifier of a verb cannot be semantically connected with a component of the presuppositional part of the verb’s meaning. This fact proves important for the lexicalization of semantic structures and for writing lexicographic definitions.

Keywords

Lexicographic definition, lexical cooccurrence, presupposition, lexical function, Explanatory Combinatorial Dictionary, lexicalization

1 The Hypothesis

This paper deals with the problem of connections between the meanings of pairs of syntactically linked lexemes. As is known, the meaning of a modifier of a lexeme L can bear not only on the whole of L’s meaning but also on a particular component of it (see, for instance, DEC 1984-1999 [semantic subscripts in brackets that accompany some names of lexical functions to indicate the targeted component of the meaning of their keywords], Apresjan 1980: 73-95 [rules of interaction of meanings], Boguslavskij 1990 and 1996 [notion of internal scope], Zaliznjak 1990 [semantic link of a verb’s modifier with different components of the verb’s meaning], Iordanskaja & Polguère 2005 [hooking up lexical functions to the definition of their keywords]). Our goal is to propose the following hypothesis:

A modifier of a verb L cannot be semantically connected with any component of the presupposition of ‘L’ (with the exception of some special cases).

In other words, the semantic scope of a verb’s modifier does not include the presuppositional part of the verb’s meaning. To avoid any confusion, let us emphasize that we deal with lexical presuppositions, rather than with presuppositions of utterances (see Polguère 1992: 126-128), and with internal, rather than external, semantic scope of modifiers (see Boguslavskij 1990).
Note also that opposing assertion to presupposition in lexicographic definitions does not preclude the existence of semantic components of a still different logical nature.

By presupposition is meant here the part of the verb’s meaning which is not affected by the operator of negation applied to the verb. Padučeva (1996: 240) points out that “presuppositions do not undergo the impact of some other operators—modal and epistemic, which, like negation, affect only the assertive part of an utterance;” she mentions two such operators: Rus. UŽE ‘already’ and the parenthetical VOZMOŽNO ‘possibly’. Going further, Apresjan (1999: 49) states: “… the insensitivity of presupposition to negation, which underlies its classical definition, turns out to manifest a more general property, namely the inertness of presuppositions. They are inaccessible (i.e., they are not included into the scope of) not only for negation, but also for some other semantically active meanings.” In conformity with this idea, we will show that the part of L’s meaning that is not affected by the negation (L’s presuppositional part) is normally also not affected by other modifiers of L.

Why consider only verbs? Because the meaning of a verb obligatorily includes an assertion, and the assertion can be negated (or interrogated); this is the basis for the opposition ‘assertion vs. presupposition.’ However, the meaning of a noun, even of a noun derived from a verb, does not have the same logical structure: there is no assertion that can be negated (or interrogated), and consequently we cannot speak of the part of the noun’s meaning that is not affected by the negation (for more, see Section 4).

The rest of the paper is divided into five sections: Section 2 illustrates the plausibility of our hypothesis by examining some classical examples of verbs with presuppositions; Section 3 is dedicated to speech verbs whose meaning includes a presupposition (3.1: French speech verbs described in Dictionnaire explicatif et combinatoire du français contemporain [DEC 1984-1999]; 3.2: a pair of Russian speech verbs distinguished only by their grammatical aspect); Section 4 compares verbs and verbal nouns from the angle of the problem discussed; Section 5 presents a case of pseudo-factive presupposition; Section 6 offers concluding remarks.

2 Verbs with Obvious Presuppositions

2.1 Factive Verbs

As is well known, a factive verb presupposes the truth of the fact to which refers the verb’s complement. This means that the definition of a factive verb includes the presupposition of the truthfulness of this fact, which is true from the viewpoint of the Speaker (Padučeva 1998: 100, discussing factive verbs, states: “The subject (bearer) of a presupposition is the Speaker …”). For example, the verb KNOW has the following meaning (a double vertical bar separates the presupposition—to its left—from the assertion):

\[ X \text{ knows that } Y = \langle Y \text{ is true from the viewpoint of the Speaker. } \| \text{ X has in his mind the information } Y \rangle. \]

Let us examine the restricted lexical cooccurrence of the corresponding Russian verb ZNAT’. Common intensifiers (i.e., the lexical function Magn; about lexical functions see, for instance, Mel’čuk 1996) of this verb are tvērdo ‘firmly’, xorōšo ‘well’ and točno ‘exactly’ [znat’]. What is the semantic scope of these Magn? The component ‘true’—a part of the presupposition—can
in principle be intensified: cf. soveršenno verno (in English—very (quite) true; note that the linguistic meaning ‘true’ is different from the logical value ‘true’, which is not intensifiable). Thus, the modifiers tvěrdo/xorošo/točno [znat’] could intensify the component ‘true’. However, this is not the case with ZNAT’. Petr tvěrdo/xorošo zná, čto Maša ego ne ljubit ‘Petr knows for sure that Masha does not love him’ means that Petr has no doubts about the information Y (Masha’s feelings) and not that the information ‘Masha does not love Petr’ is very true from the Speaker’s viewpoint. What is characterized by these intensifiers is the state of mind of X—the bearer of the information Y—and not the state of mind of the Speaker. As for the phrase točno znat’, it allows for two interpretations featuring two different lexemes TOČNO: the first interpretation is the same as for tvěrdo znat’ (concerning the state of mind of X), and the second (less natural) is ‘the Speaker is sure that X has the information Y’. In both interpretations the adverb točno does not intensify ‘true’. Thus, the modifiers in question do not bear on the presupposition of the verb ZNAT’.

It seems that what has just been said holds also for free modifiers of ZNAT’, for example, davno ‘for a long time’, teper’ ‘now’, zavtra ‘tomorrow’: they characterize time-wise the state of mind of X.

2.2 Verbs of Judging

The classical paper Fillmore 1971 presents the meanings of ten English verbs of judging; all of these meanings include presuppositions. We would like to consider two of these verbs—ACCUSE and CRITICIZE. However, since in Section 3.1 we examine French speech verbs, which include ACCUSERI and CRITIQUERIA—the exact equivalents of the above English verbs, it seems convenient, in order to avoid repetition, to consider below these French verbs. Here are their definitions taken from DEC-IV but presented in English; we simplified and organized them differently, in accordance with Fillmore’s schema. The definitions are accompanied by all modifiers of these verbs given in their entries as their lexical functions [= LF].

**ACCUSERI:** X accuse Y de Z

Assertion : X says that Y is responsible for Z
Presupposition : Z is bad
LF modifiers : accuser violemment / à tort / injustement / sans preuve / sans raison

**CRITIQUERIA:** X critique Y pour Z

Assertion : X says that Z is bad
Presupposition : Z takes place and Y is responsible for Z
LF modifiers : critiquer violemment / sèvèrement / vivement /avec aigreur = aigrement / amèrement /avec âpreté = âprement / poliment / timidement / sans arrêt / sans cesse / abondamment / ouvertement / à juste titre /à tort et à travers / injustement / sans motif valable / sans raison

The LF modifiers of the two verbs fall into two types: Magn and Ver/AntiVer. The modifiers of both types are linked to the assertion rather than the presupposition. Magn characterizes the manner or the frequency of saying, and Ver/AntiVer is about the well-foundedness of the
message’s content. For example, accuser sans raison ‘accuse without reason’ does not mean that the judgment ‘Z is bad’ (presupposition) is unfounded; what is unfounded is the statement ‘Y is responsible for Z’ (a part of the assertion). However, critiquer sans raison ‘criticize without reason’—because CRITIQUER has a different distribution of the (almost) identical semantic components—means that the judgment ‘Z is bad’ (assertion) is unfounded, but the two presuppositions ‘Z takes place’ and ‘Y is responsible for Z’ are not affected.

Now, what about free modifiers, for example, presque ‘almost’? In X a presque accusé Y de Z, this modifier does not affect the presupposition of negativeness of Z: presque bears on ‘say’. In a similar way, in X a presque critiqué Y pour Z also both presuppositions (the one of factivity and the one of responsibility of Y for Z) remain untouched.

The Russian adverb NAPRASNO ‘in vain’ is semantically linked to the meaning of a verb on which the adverb syntactically depends. As shown in Zaliznjak 1990, when NAPRASNO modifies verbs of the type PODOZREVAT´ ‘suspect’—which encodes the negative evaluation of a fact as a presupposition and the existence of this fact as an assertion—and verbs of the type OSUŽDAT´ ‘condemn’ with the inverse logical structure (the negative evaluation of the fact is asserted and its existence is presupposed), in both cases the adverb is semantically connected to the assertion and not to the presupposition.

3 Speech Verbs

3.1 French Speech Verbs in DEC

We have examined all speech verbs described in DEC whose meaning includes presuppositions (which are, by the way, not always presented explicitly): PERMETTRE ‘permit’, AUTORISER ‘authorize’, DÉFENDRE ‘forbid’, INTERDIRE ‘prohibit’, CONSENTIR ‘agree’, REFUSER ‘refuse’, ACCUSER ‘accuse’, BLÂMER ‘blame’, CONDAMNER ‘condemn’, CRITIQUER ‘criticize’, DÉSAPPROUVER ‘disapprove’, REPROCHER ‘reproach’, DÉFIER ‘challenge’, PRIER ‘beg’, INVITER ‘invite’, and CONSEILLER ‘advise’. The result of the study is that the LF modifiers of these verbs are never connected with their presuppositions. They are linked to the assertion: either to the central predicate ‘say’, or to a subordinate predicate referring to the content of the message, or else to a superordinate predicate referring to the goal of saying; the link can be direct or via an intermediate meaning (for the indirect link of a LF to the meaning of a lexical unit, see Iordanskaja & Polguère 2005). The only exception would be the adverb amèrement combined with reprocher (reprocher amèrement ‘reproach bitterly’), which is described as an intensifier of a presuppositional component of the verb’s meaning. But we do not agree with this description; our counter-arguments are presented at the end of this subsection.

In Section 2, while considering the verbs ACCUSERI and CRITIQUERIA with their cooccurrence, we have established that modifiers of these verbs are linked semantically to the assertive part of their meaning. We present below two more verbs from the above list. (Reproducing the DEC definitions, we allow ourselves some minor corrections.)

DÉFENDRE’I.1 (DEC-II) [Les policiers défendent aux photographes d’utiliser leurs appareils.]
Lexicographic definition and lexical cooccurrence

$X$ défend à $Z$ de $Y$-er = ‘$X$ thinks that $Z$ wants to do an action $Y$ and that $Z$ should not do against the will of $X$. || $X$ says to $Z$ that $Y$ would be contrary to the will of $X$ and therefore $X$ does not give to $Z$ the freedom to do $Y$’

LF modifiers: défendre strictement, absolument, catégoriquement, rigoureusement, totalement, formellement, expressément

These modifiers bear on either the predicate ‘say’ (manner of saying: formellement, expressément), or a component belonging to the content of message—‘not give the freedom’ (strictement, absolument, catégoriquement, rigoureusement, totalement). Although the presupposition includes an obviously gradable predicate ‘$Z$ wants’, there is no intensifier that would be connected to this predicate. Free modifiers also do not bear on the presupposition: in the phrases défendre souvent ‘often’, hier ‘yesterday’, à haute voix ‘with a loud voice’, etc. the modifier is semantically connected to ‘say’.

CONSENTIR2a (DEC-III) [Les parents ont consenti au mariage.]

$X$ consentit à $Y$ = ‘A person asks $X$ to allow for the situation $Y$ to take place. || $X$ says to this person that $X$ has decided not to be opposed to $Y$’

LF modifiers: consentir expressément, formellement, pleinement, avec joie, de bon coeur, volontiers, de bonne grâce, avec réticence, de mauvaise grâce, du bout des lèvres

All these modifiers bear either on the central predicate ‘say’, or on an embedded predicate, but not on a predicate from the presupposition. (The same is true of free modifiers: consentir tout de suite ‘at once’, hier ‘yesterday’, presque ‘almost’, etc.)

As was said above, the only counter-example is the phrase reprocher amèrement ‘reproach bitterly’. It is time to analyze this case more closely. Here is (with minor omissions) the definition of reprocher1b, presented in DEC-IV; we need to present also the definition of reprocher1a, because ‘reprocher1a’ is used in the definition of reprocher1b.

REPROCHER1b (DEC-IV) [Il nous a violemment reproché tous ses malheurs.]

$X$ reproche1b $Y$ à $Z$ = ‘With the goal to make $Z$ feel guilty, $X$ says to $Z$ that $X$ reproaches1a [= reproche1a] $Y$ to $Z$’

$X$ reproche1a $Y$ à $Z$ = ‘$X$ is convinced that $Y$ takes place and that $Z$ is responsible for $Y$; $Y$ affects negatively the emotional state of $X$. || $X$ has in his mind that he does not excuse $Z$ for $Y$ and also $X$ thinks that $Z$ must be conscious that $Y$ is bad’ [Dans son âme, sa mère lui a toujours reproché amèrement ses échecs scolaires.]

LF modifiers for reprocher1b: reprocher durement, vivement, violemment, gentiment, amèrement, à juste titre, avec raison, à tort, injustement, du regard.

All these modifiers characterize either the manner of saying, or the well-foundedness / unfoundedness of the statement. In DEC, the adverb amèrement is described as Magn with respect to the component ‘affect’, and this component belongs to the presupposition of
‘reprocher1a’, used in the definition of ‘reprocher1b’. We believe, however, that the definitions above need some changes. Let us begin with ‘reprocher1a’. In our opinion, first, the central component of the definition must be the negative emotional attitude of X to a person Z (in the BDéf database, which is a formalization of definitions from DEC [see Altman & Polguère 2003] we see exactly this); second, the component ‘Y affects negatively the emotional state of X’ must be more specific: it is the behavior of Z which affects X; and finally, this specific component is part of the assertion. We propose the following definition of reprocher1a:

\[ X \text{ reproche} \, Y \, à \, Z = \langle X \text{ is convinced that } Y \text{ takes place and that } Z \text{ is responsible for } Y. \text{ || } X \text{ has a negative emotional attitude to } Z \text{ caused by the following: } X \text{ thinks that the behavior } Y \text{ of } Z \text{ or the behavior of } Z \text{ that caused } Y \text{ is inexcusable and this behavior affects } X \rangle \]

In the sentence with negation \textit{Même dans son âme, sa mère ne lui a jamais reproché ses échecs scolaires} ‘Even in her soul, his mother never reproached him for his school failures’ the whole assertive part is negated: it is denied that the mother had a negative emotional attitude to her son because of his behavior and that his behavior had affected her (for example, she understands that her son tried hard but he is not bright enough; so she does not blame him for his failures). Therefore, ‘affect’ is part of the assertion. Now let us consider the phrase reprocher amèrement. In the sentence \textit{Dans son âme, sa mère lui a toujours reproché amèrement ses échecs scolaires} ‘In her soul, his mother always reproached him bitterly for his school failures’ the adverb amèrement is semantically connected to the component ‘affect’—as it is presented in DEC (amèrement is Magn that specifies ‘affect’: ‘this behavior causes the bitterness of X’), but, in our opinion, this component belongs to the assertion.

Now, the turn of reprocher1b. We propose the following definition:

\[ X \text{ reproche} \, Y \, à \, Z = \langle X \text{ is convinced that } Y \text{ takes place and that } Z \text{ is responsible for } Y. \text{ || With the goal to make } Z \text{ feel guilty, } X \text{ says to } Z \text{ that } X \text{ thinks that the behavior } Y \text{ of } Z \text{ or the behavior of } Z \text{ that caused } Y \text{ is inexcusable; } X \text{ says it in a manner which manifests that this behavior affects } X \rangle \]

In the sentence \textit{Marie ne reprochait jamais à son mari de gagner peu d’argent} ‘Mary did never reproach her husband for gaining little money’ the negation denies the whole assertive part of the definition, including the emotional manner of expressing the reproach. As for the phrase reprocher1b amèrement, similarly to reprocher1a amèrement, the adverb expresses Magn that makes more specific the component ‘affect’ (‘[which manifests that this behavior] causes the bitterness of X’), this component being part of the assertion.

3.2 Russian Verbs UGOVARIVAT’ ‘try to persuade’ vs. UGOVORIT’ ‘have persuaded’

Apresjan (1999: 48) shows that Russian has a type of verbs such that the meaning of a verb in the perfective aspect includes—as its presupposition—the meaning of the same verb in the imperfective aspect; this fact determines the difference in the lexical cooccurrence of these two verbal forms. We will consider a pair of verbs of this type.
The Russian verbs UGOVARIVAT´ (‘try to persuade’) [imperfective aspect] and UGOVORIT´ ‘have persuaded’ [perfective aspect] have different lexical cooccurrence, in particular, different Magn: gorjačo ‘ardently’ (*polnost’ju ‘completely’) ugovarivat’ vs. polnost’ju (*gorjačo) ugovorit’. We will try to show that this difference is conditioned by the different logical organization of the meanings of these verbs.

Glovinskaja (2001: 106) considers this pair as a case of the following aspectual opposition: ‘to act having a goal’ vs. ‘the goal is achieved’, which is presented also in the pair REŠAT´ ‘try to solve’ vs. REŠIT´ ‘have solved’, analyzed in Apresjan 1980: 64 [1995: 59-60]. Apresjan claims that in this case the difference between the imperfective and perfective forms comes down to 1) the transfer the meaning of the imperfective form into the presupposition of the perfective one, and 2) the appearance, in the meaning of the perfective form, of the assertion about the achievement of the goal. Let us present the definitions by Apresjan:

\[ X \text{ rešal } Y \] = ‘The person X was pondering information concerning the product of thought Y—with the goal of getting an answer to the question implied by Y [assertion]’

\[ X \text{ rešil } Y \] = ‘The person X was pondering information concerning the product of thought Y—with the goal of getting an answer to a question implied by Y [presupposition]. || X got the answer [assertion]’

Now, in accordance with Apresjan’s schema, we will formulate the definitions of our two verbs (the imperfective one has its own presupposition; however, the logical structure of the imperfective form is irrelevant for the present discussion):

\[ X \text{ ugovarivaet } Y \text{ sdelat’ } Z \] = ‘X wants Y to do Z, which Y does not want to do. || X says something to Y with the goal to cause that Y agrees to do Z’

\[ X \text{ ugovoril } Y \text{ sdelat’ } Z \] = ‘X tried to persuade Y [X ugovarival Y-ăn] to do Z [presupposition]. || X has caused that Y agreed to do Z [assertion]’

As is easily seen, the meaning of the perfective verb UGOVORIT´ contains the meaning of the imperfective verb UGOVARIVAT´. However, the modifier gorja o, which is natural with UGOVARIVAT´, is impossible with UGOVORIT´. We believe that this is because of the presuppositional status of the meaning ‘ugovarivat´’ within the meaning of the perfective verb UGOVORIT´.

4 Verbal Nouns

Now let us consider the verbal nouns that have the same meaning as their base verb or a meaning that is related to the base verb in a regular way (more precisely, it can be S₀ or S₂, S₃ and even S₃res, derived from the base verb). Some of these nouns admit modifiers linked to a component of the noun’s meaning that has presuppositional status in the meaning of the corresponding verb. Thus, in the phrase Fr. accusation grave, lourde ‘serious, heavy accusation’ (or soupçon grave, abominable ‘serious, terrible suspicion’) the adjective intensifies the evaluative component ‘bad’—which is a presupposition in the meaning of the verb accuser (and soupçonner). But, as we have already said, the notion of presupposition—
the part of L’s meaning that is not affected by the negation of L—does not apply to a noun: a noun does not express an assertion that can be negated and therefore has no presupposition (what is a presupposition in a verb’s meaning becomes a characterizer of an actant in the noun’s meaning). As a result, the existence of phrases of the type accusation/soupçon grave does not contradict our hypothesis. Interestingly, although *accuser/soupçonner gravement is ungrammatical (because of the presuppositional status of the evaluative component in the meaning of these verbs), critiquer sérieusement ‘criticize seriously’ is correct—along with critique sérieuse ‘serious criticism’, where the adjective, as well as in accusation grave, intensifies the evaluative component. This contrast is explained by the fact that in ‘critiquer’ the evaluative component represents an assertion. Cf. the parallelism in erreur grave ‘serious mistake’—se tromper gravement ‘to be seriously mistaken’ and blesser grave ‘serious wound’ — blesser gravement ‘to wound seriously’: the verbal phrases are correct because the component that is intensified belongs to the assertion inside the verb’s meaning.

This difference in the behavior of verbs and nouns can be used during the transition from the semantic representation of an utterance to its deep-syntactic representation, a process that includes the choice of lexical units:

Lexicalization must preclude the construction of a phrase where a modifier of the verb L is semantically linked to the presupposition of ‘L’.

Let us assume, for example, that in a semantic structure the semanteme ‘A’ is linked with the semanteme ‘B’ and that ‘A’ is expressed in the deep-syntactic structure by an adverb A; then we cannot choose for the subnet ‘C’ that includes ‘B’ a verb L, if the meaning ‘B’ enters into the presuppositional part of ‘L’. However, we can use a verbal noun and add to it a support verb. Taking our example above: if we cannot choose the verb ACCUSER (under the condition that the semantic structure contains the semanteme ‘very’, which is connected with the semanteme ‘bad’), we can use the noun phrase accusation grave introduced by its Oper1 (porter/lancer une accusation grave).

The formulated restriction on lexicalization is especially important for free modifiers because non-free modifiers can be chosen by means of the Explanatory Combinatorial Dictionary.

5 The Case of Pseudo-factive Presupposition

There is at least one case when a modifier can affect a presupposition, namely, if this is a pseudo-factive presupposition ‘X [but not the Speaker!] thinks that Y takes place’ and the modifier refutes this belief of X. Such modifier is, for instance, the Russian adverb NAPRASNO ‘in vain’ in the sense of fallaciousness of a belief (one of three senses of this adverb; see Zaliznjak 1990, who points out the possibility for this adverb’s meaning to connect to the verb’s presupposition). For example, the sentence Maša naprasno uprekaet Petra v tom, to on napisal èto pis’mo; on ego ne pisal ‘Masha is wrong reproaching Petr for having written this letter; he did not write it’ is perfectly normal: the Speaker claims the fallaciousness of the belief of Masha (UPREKAT ‘to reproach’ has the presupposition ‘X is convinced that Y takes place’; see in Section 3 the definition of the corresponding French verb REPROCHER1b). Interestingly, the sentence ‘Maša naprasno obvinjaet Petra v tom, to on napisal èto pis’mo; v postupke Petra net ni ego ploxogo ‘Masha is wrong accusing Petr of having written this letter; there is nothing bad in his act’ is strange: naprasno cannot signify here the fallaciousness—from the viewpoint of the Speaker—of the negative evaluation of Z
(which is the presupposition of the meaning ‘accuse’). The reason is that in this case there is no possibility of the gap between opinions of the Speaker and the subject X, the negative evaluation of Z being an objective fact; see the following component in the definition of English verb ACCUSE in Wierzbicka 1987: 164: “I [the Speaker] assume that everyone would say that doing Y [our Z] is bad.”

6 Conclusion

The hypothesis advanced in this paper, namely—’The presuppositional part of the meaning of a verb is not accessible for the meanings of the lexical cooccurrents of the verbs, except for some special cases’—cannot be proven experimentally: one cannot consider all verbs in combination with all possible modifiers (not mentioning that writing the definition of each lexical unit constitutes itself a very hard task). However, this hypothesis seems natural because of the special status of the presuppositional meaning. As Polguère 2003: 187 points out, this status imposes strong constraints on the linguistic behaviour of the Speaker. Thus, the resistance of the presupposition to modification can be considered as one of these constraints.

The formulated constraint on the semantic connection between a verb and its modifier must be taken into account when specifying the definition of a given verb.

Let us note, however, that besides the case of pseudo-factive presupposition, there can be other cases when the part of a verb's meaning that is insensitive to negation can be sensitive to some modifiers of the verb. When more of such cases are found we will have a new challenge: to explain the cases of deviation from the formulated general tendency.

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